报告1：Political Ideology in Regulatory Oversight: Evidence from Banking
摘要：This paper analyzes the relationship between political ideology and the supervisory decisions of bank regulators. Using commercial and savings banks in the United States, I show that the political ideology of individual regulators, as revealed by their voting records and party affiliation, influences their enforcement decisions. Regulators affiliated with or leaning toward the Republican party are less likely to initiate enforcement actions against banks. The impact of political ideology could be mitigated by the proper organizational structure and bank transparency. In addition, enforcement files by Republican regulators are more numerically intense and have more positive tones. Republican regulators are more likely to mention CAMELS-related issues in enforcement files, with the exception of management-related issues. Inconsistent regulation due to personal political ideology leads to costly outcomes. I find that it provides opportunities for banks to arbitrage for less stringent supervision through the strategic relocation of their branches. Laxer supervision by Republican regulators also encourages banks to take on more risk and increases bank insolvency risk. This in turn leads to higher bank failure rates, especially failures that occur without the warning signals of enforcement actions.
报告2：Hiding under the table: Transparency of executive hedging and firm performance
摘要：This study explores the impact of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) mandatory disclosure rule for executive hedging on firms’ economic performance. Using the novel textual data about executive hedging policies and practices from proxy statements, I find the positive impact of the mandate on firms’ performance and shareholder value. The transparency of executive hedging would increase the cost of hedging and restore the interest alignment, leading to better economic outcomes. The cross-sectional analysis shows that the positive impact of the mandate on firm performance is more salient for firms with higher incentives of strategic hedging, lower investment efficiency, and a less transparent information environment ex-ante. The research sheds light on the limited study of executive hedging and demonstrates the bright side of the SEC’s mandatory disclosure rule.
报告3：ESG as Life-Time Warranty: Economic Consequences of China’s ESG Accountability Regulation
摘要：We study whether holding managers accountable for negative ESG performance affects their investment and disclosure decisions. Exploiting mainland China’s 2015 ESG accountability regulation as a quasi-experiment and a difference-in-differences specification, we find that the regulatory imposed managerial accountability leads to a decrease in sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions and an increase in the provision of quantitative SO2 emissions disclosure. Consistent with the regulation altering manager incentives, the results are more pronounced when managers have longer career horizon and greater legal liability concerns. Overall, we provide evidence that ex post labor market settlements effectively motivate managers to improve ESG performance and transparency.